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Notes
SUBCHAPTER S-SHAREHOLDER DEBT AND THE ONE CLASS

OF STOCK RULE
I. INTRODUCIMON

In 1958 Congress enacted legislation' which, at the election of the
stockholders, permits corporations to forego the payment of any tax
and requires their shareholders to report the corporate income as their
own for tax purposes.3 The stated purpose of the legislation is to permit businesses to select the form of business organization desired
without the necessity of taking into account major differences in tax
consequences. 4
For taxable years to which the election applies, the federal income
tax on the corporation is eliminated. 5 However, the corporation's taxable income is taxed, whether or not distributed, to its shareholders as
of the last day of the corporation's taxable year as if on such day there
had been a pro rata dividend distribution of the corporation's taxable
income. In order that subchapter S will operate in as simple a manner as possible, the income taxed to the shareholders is usually treated
as ordinary income without regard to any special characteristics it
might have had in the bands of the corporation.( However, there is an
exception in the case of long-term capital gain income which generally
passes through to the shareholder level.7

Only "small business corporations" are eligible to elect subchapter
S treatment.8 A small business corporation is a bona fide corporation
which has no more than ten shareholders each of whom is either an
individual or an estate, has no shareholder who is a nonresident alien,
and has only one class of stock.9 It is this last requirement which has
resulted in some of the major tax litigation involving subchapter S
corporations. One way in which litigation can arise is when the Commissioner of Internal Revenue [hereinafter Commissioner] asserts that
purported debt of the corporation is, in reality, equity capital and, as
2

INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 [hereinafter cited as IRC] § 1371-79.

IRC § 1372.
3 IRC § 1373.
4S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1958).
5IRC § 1372(b)(1).
6 IRC § 1373.
7
IRC § 1375(a).
8
IRC § 1372(a).
9IRC § 1371(a).
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such, constitutes a second class of stock. The basis for this assertion is
found in litigation involving conventional corporations, that is, corporations which have not elected the provisions of subchapter S. It is the
author's purpose to explore the regulatory and judicial history of this
assertion and to compare the present status of the law in this area with
the stated purposes of subchapter S and the one class of stock rule.
II. SARmoxnOua DEBT IN Tm CONVENTIONAL CORPORATION
To fully understand the assertion that debt may constitute a second
class of stock for a corporation electing subchapter S treatment, it is
necessary to understand how shareholder debt is treated in the
case of a conventional corporation. It is a common practice in the
closely-held corporation for the shareholder to loan funds to the
corporation in lieu of purchasing additional capital stock.' 0 This
practice has two distinct tax advantages. The interest paid or accrued
on the debt is deductible by the corporation in determining its taxable
income, and subsequent repayment of the debt will generally be taxfree to the creditor-shareholder." The interest payments are taxed to
the shareholder, but this is the only tax to which the payment is
subjected. If the shareholders had purchased additional capital stock
instead of debt obligations, however, then any payments based on
such capital stock would not be an allowable deduction to the corporation in determining its taxable income. Instead, the distributions
would be out of the corporation's post-tax earnings and profits. This
distribution is then taxed to the shareholder as a dividend, in effect
taxing the corporation's earnings twice.' 2 Shareholder debt in the
coventional corporation, then, is a device for eliminating this double
tax.
It is not uncommon for the Commissioner to attack this arrangement
and to assert that the shareholder debt is in reality equity capital.'3
Since the interest payments are not made for a valid indebtedness of
the corporation the corporation is not allowed an interest deduction for
the payments. Instead, the Commissioner asserts that these payments
are really "disguised dividends" since they were paid on what is really
equity capital.
The criteria to be used in determining whether or not the shareholder debt is in reality equity capital have been thus stated:
10 B. Brrrmm & J. EuSmcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION OF CORPORA.TION
AND SHAREHOLDERs § 4.02, at 121 (2d. ed. 1966).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. § 4.02, at 122.
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There are at least eleven separate determining factors generally
used by the courts in determining whether amounts advanced to
a corporation constitute equity capital or indebtedness. They are
(1) the names given to the certificates evidencing the indebtedness; (2) the presence or absence of a maturity date; (3) the
source of the payments; (4) the right to enforce the payment of
principal and interest; (5) participating in management; (6) a
status equal to or inferior to that of regular corporate creditors;
(7) the intent of the parties; (8) 'thin' or adequate capitalization;
(9) identity of interest between creditors and stockholders; (10)
payment of interest only out of 'dividend' money; (11) the abiltiy
of the corporation to obtain loans from outside lending institutions. 14
To this list might be added other criteria, for example, that all
the initial payments, both capital and advances, were made for the
acquisition of capital assets by the corporation, 15 or that they were
made for the purpose of beginning the corporate life.-' No comprehensive rule can be stated which will be applicable in all cases 7 but
the primary question to be answered in each case is whether or not
the intent and acts of the parties should be disregarded in characterizing the transaction for federal tax purposes.' 8
The position which the courts have taken in determining the
characterization to be given the transaction has been stated thusly:
We cannot, by manipulation of tax law, preclude the parties from
exercising sound&.business judgment i obtaining needed investment funds at the most favorable rate possible, whether it be a
commercial loan, or, more likely . . . a loan from private in-

terested sources with sufficient faith in the success of the venture
and their ultimate repayment to delete or minimize the 'risk
factor' in their rate of return. We must not forget that while the
principles articulated... continue to furnish helpful guidelines, application of these so-called factors, or any one of them, must be
tempered by an awareness that from our Commission as Judges
we are not qualified, or certainly not the best qualified persons, to
determine the many intricacies of transactions in the business
world. Our guidance in making fact decisions and in declaring or
applying legal principles must come from the enlightment afforded by an evidentiary record reflecting the facts the business
world regards as significant. 19
14O. H. Kruse Grain & Milling v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 123, 125 (9th
Cir. 1960).
15 Commissioner v. Meridian & Thirteenth Realty Co., 132 F.2d 182 (7th
Cir. 1942).
16 Janeway v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1945).
17 Montclair Inc. v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 38, 40 (5th Cir. 1963).
18 Tomiinson v. The 1661 Corp., 377 F.2d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 1967).
19 Id. at 300.
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An impressive body of law has thus been developed for application
to the situation where a conventional corporation attempts to avoid
the double taxation of dividends through the guise of interest payments on shareholder debt.
It is this same body of law which the Commissioner has attempted
to apply to a corporation electing the provisions of subchapter S.
However, the underlying purpose of this body of law, to prevent
corporations and their shareholders from avoiding the double taxation of dividends, is not applicable to a subchapter S corporation.
Whether the payment is characterized as interest or dividend, it will
reduce the corporation's undistributed taxable income. Since a shareholder of a subchapter S corporation is taxed personally on his pro
rata share of the corporation's taxable income, whether or not it is
distributed,20 then he will be taxed on the same amount no matter
how the payment is characterized. The foregoing statement can best
be illustrated by the following example.
XYZ Corporation, an electing subchapter S corporation, had taxable income of $20,000 for the year 1969. The corporation made no
distributions to its sole shareholder, A, during the year. However, it
did pay A $2,000 as interest on a loan which A had made to the
corporation. The corporation deducted the $2,000, as interest expense
in arriving at its taxable income of $20,000. Since A is the sole
shareholder of the corporation, then he will include the entire $20,000
on his personal return for 1969. He will also include the $2,000
interest payment in his personal income. A is thereby taxed on
$22,000.
If, however, the $2,000 payment were characterized as a dividend,
then the corporation would not have been able to deduct it in arriving
at its taxable income. The corporation's taxable income, then, would
be $22,000. A would still be taxed on only $22,000 since the $2,000
dividend would be a distribution to him of the $22,000 on which he
was already taxed. A double tax on the dividend is thus avoided.
The underlying purpose for applying the body of law to the subchapter S corporation lies elsewhere. If the Commissioner is successful in contending that the shareholder debt really amounts to a
second class of stock, then the corporation's election under subchapter S will be terminated.21 The termination will be retroactive to
the first day of the taxable year in which the second class of stock first
came into existence. Thus, all income for that year and for all subsequent years will be taxed to the corporation, and any distributions
20
2

IRC § 1373.
1 I'C § 1372(e) (3).
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which the corporation has made will be taxed to the shareholders as
dividends. A double tax is thus imposed.
III. SIARU oLDER DEBT IN TI

SuBciHIrrxn S CoRPoIRATIoN

regulations 22

The original
to subchapter S are illuminating on the
subject of when a small business corporation has more than one
class of stock. They provide as follows:
A corporation having more than one class of stock does not qualify
as a small business corporation. In determining whether a corporation has more than one class of stock, only stock which is issued

and outstanding is considered. Therefore, treasury stock and unissued stock of a different class than that held by the shareholders will not disqualify a corporation under section 1371 (a) (4).
If the outstanding shares of stock of the corporation are not

identical with respect to the rights and interest which they convey
in the control, profits, and assets of the corporation, then the
corporation is considered to have more than one class of stock.
Thus, a difference as to voting rights, dividend rights, or liquidation preferences of outstanding stock will disqualify a corporation.
However, if two or more groups of shares are identical in every
respect except that each group has the right to elect members of
the board of directors in a number proportionate to the number of
shares in each group, they are considered one class of stock. If an
instrument proporting to be a debt obligation is actually stock,

it will constitute a second class of stock.23 (Emphasis added).

Where purported debt is involved, the regulations contain an automatic rule that makes such purported debt a second class of stock.
Thus, if the corporation fails to prove that the debt is not really equity,
then the corporation's election will be automatically terminated under
the regulation.
A leading case where the regulation has been applied is Catalina
Homes, Inc.2 4 There, the corporation was a newly formed real estate
development company with paid-in capital of $10,000 consisting of
200 shares of no par common stock, all of which was owned by two
families. Two of the shareholders entered into an agreement whereby
they loaned $70,000 to the corporation over a two year period. Under
the terms of the agreement interest at the rate of five percent was to
be paid as determined by the corporation's board of directors. Also,
no dividends were to be paid on the common stock until the loans
had been paid in full.
The Commissioner contended that the loans were really equity
capital, and that as such, they were a second class of stock pursuant
22

23

Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g), T.D. 6432, 1960-1 Cum. BuL. 321.

Id.

2423

CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1361 (1964).
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to the regulations. The corporation contended that the loans were
valid corporate debt obligations because they were not held by the
shareholders in the same ratio as they held the corporation's outstanding stock.
The Tax Court held that the loans were in reality a second class
of stock. Among the factors which the court considered determinative
of the issue were: (1) interest was not payable in any event; (2) the
purported lenders never demanded or contemplated demanding
repayment; (3) there were no notes or other evidence of indebtedness;
(4) the corporation's original working capital was inadequate to meet
the future needs of the business; and (5) all of the advances were
made within five months of the date of incorporation. Also, the court
pointed out that most of the income was distributed rather than used
to repay the loans. These factors indicated to the court that the loans
were permanent capital subject to the risk of the business.2 5 The court
rejected the corporation's argument, supra, by stating that proportionality between the amount of the purported loans and individual stock
holdings is merely an "indication" that the advances constitute capital
26
contributions.
Although the Tax Court placed emphasis on the fact that the loans
were made in the early months of the corporation's existence, 27 a
similar decision was reached by a federal district court in Henderson
v. United States28 where the purported loans were made in the later
years of the corporation's existence. Without citing the Tax Court's
holding in Catalina Homes, Inc., the court held that pro rata shareholder loans were, based on the evidence, intended to take the risks
incident to a capital investment. Among the factors which the court
found to be determinative were: (1) the loans were in proportion to
stock ownership; (2) there was no security for the loans; (3) there
was no intention to enforce the obligations in accordance with their
terms; and (4) at the formation of the company the stockholders were
aware that they would later be required to advance $30,000 for equip29
ment purchases.
Thus, both courts made a factual determination that the purported loans were in reality equity capital. Having reached this
decision, both courts then sustained the Commissioner's contention
that under the regulation the purported debt was a second class of
stock. One fact stands out in each case. Both courts based their opinions
25

Id. at 1365-66.

26 Id. at 1367.
27 Id. at 1366.

28 245 F. Supp.
2) Id.at 786.

782 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
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on the criteria which were developed in the conventional corporation
situation discussed supra. Neither court discussed whether these
criteria were applicable to the subchapter S situation.
However, the Commissioner's victories were short-lived. In the
case of W. C. Gamman,30 loans by the shareholders to the corporation
were far in excess of its paid-in stated capital and were, in effect,
placed at the risk of the business, thus representing additional invested capital. But, when the Commissioner attempted to void the
corporation's election because it had a second class of stock, the
corporation contended that the regulation was invalid.
This time, the Tax Court decided in favor of the taxpayer and
held that the regulation went beyond the Congressional intent and
was not within the scope of the statute. 31 In so doing, the court
enunciated a new rule making it a question of fact to be determined
in each case whether there is additional invested equity capital as
well as whether the result is a second class of stock causing the loss
of subchapter S status. 32 The court said that it would look at the
realities of the situation to determine whether the instrument gave
the holders any rights and interests different from those of the holders
of the nominal stock. It was noted that the notes were held by the
stockholders in direct proportion to their stockholdings and whatever
preferences they had were over themselves as stockholders. The
court concluded that the notes were not true debt obligations nor
were they a second class of stock, but rather contributions to capital
"which were in reality reflected in the value of the common stock
33
already held by petitioners."
The court also considered the applicability of the debt-equity
criteria used in the conventional corporation situation to determine
whether there is more than one class of stock for purposes of subchapter S. Noting that this doctrine was developed by the courts
to prevent normal corporations from avoiding the double tax by
distribution of earnings in the form of interest or by repayment of
loans, the court held that it did not apply to subchapter S corporations
since the very purpose of the statute was to exempt them from the
double tax. Since this particular corporation had no accumulated
earnings, there was little in the way of unintended tax advantages to
be obtained by letting the stockholders advance funds in the form
34
of loans rather than capital.
8046 T.C. 1 (1966).
31Id. at 8.
321d. at 11.
331d. at 9.
4Id. at 12.
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As a result of this reversal, the regulation was amended in 1966.
As amended, it states that purported debt which is in reality
. equity capital will generally constitute a second class of stock.
However, if such purported debt obligations are owned solely by
the owners of the nominal stock of the corporation in substantially
the same proportion as they own such nominal stock, such
purported debt obligations will be treated as contributions to
capital rather than a second class of stock. But, if an issuance,
redemption, sale, or other transfer of nominal stock, or of purported debt obligations which actually represent equity capital,
results in a change in a shareholder's proportionate share of such
purported debt, a new determination shall be made as to whether
the corporation has more than one class of stock as of the time of
such change.35
It might be paradoxical at this point to reconsider the Henderson8
and CatalinaHomes37 cases under the new regulation. In Henderson,
one of the factors which influenced the court's decision that the debt
was really a second class of stock was the fact that the loans were
held in proportion to stock ownership.38 Thus, the corporation would
probably have been victorious in this case since the current regulation
would treat such loans as capital contributions rather than a second
class of stock. In Catalina Homes, however, the change in the regulation probably would not change the result of the case. Since the
corporation had contended that the loans were not held in proportion
to stock ownership,3 9 then the case could not fall under the exception
in the regulation, but rather would come under the general rule which
states that purported debt will generally constitute a second class of
40
stock.
However, recent cases indicate that some courts have refused to
follow the new regulation when confronted with the situation where
the purported debt obligations are not held in the same proportion as
the nominal capital stock. In August F. Neilsen Company, Inc.41 the
corporation had outstanding 1,400 shares of 8100 par value common
stock which was held equally by the corporation's two shareholders.
In addition, each shareholder held a $40,000, six percent promissory
note, originally issued in 1952. Disproportionate payments were made
35
Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g), T.D. 6904, 1967-1 Cum. BuL. 219, amending
Treas.3 Reg. § 1.1371-1(g), T.D. 6432, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 321.
6 Henderson v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 782 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
3
7 Catalina Homes, Inc., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1361 (1964).
38 245 F. Supp. at 786.
39
23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1367.
40
Treas. Reg. §1.1371-1(g), T.D. 6904, 1967-1 Cum. BuLL. 219; c.f.
August F. Nielson Co., 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 44, 50 (1968).
4127 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 44 (1968).
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on the notes, and at the end of 1958 the two notes had been reduced
to $10,000 and $5,000 respectively. The Commissioner contended that
the disproportionate balance of the notes resulted in the vesting in
the shareholders of rights in the profits and assets of the corporation
which were disproportionate to the rights and interests vested in them
by the nominal stock, and therefore the notes were in the nature of
42
preferred stock.
The court concluded that the notes were not true indebtedness,
but were an equity interest.43 However, it refused to call the purported debt a second class of stock and noted that
the regulation does not state that it shall be considered that a
corporation has more than one class of stock in every instance
where there has been a change in a shareholder's proportionate
share .44. . of a purported debt which actually represents equity
capital.
The court also concluded that even though the payments on the notes
were disproportionate, there was no intention to create a preferred
interest and the repayments ultimately would be equal.45
In Portage Plastics Company, Incorporated v. United States,46
several factors led to the conclusion that purported loans actually constituted contribution to capital. Among these were the fact that
interest was payable only out of profits before taxes, the loans were
subordinated to certain bank loans, and there was no provision for
acceleration in case of default.47 Thus, the court followed the traditional debt-equity criteria in determining that the loans were actually
equity capital. However, the court refused to follow the amended
regulation48 and call the loans a second class of stock. The court concluded.
that the traditional debt-equity tests applied in other areas of tax
litigation are [not] relevant to the general purpose of subchapter
S or to the two conceivable purposes of the one class of stock
requirement ... 49
The latter two purposes are to avoid the administrative complexities
which would arise from having to allocate earnings and losses among
different classes of stock and to make the election available for the
42Id. at 49-50.
43Id. at 49.
44Id. at 50.
45Id.

46301 F. Supp. 684 (W. D. Wis. 1969).
47 Id. at 689-90.
48
Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g), T. D. 6904, 1967-1 Cum. BULL 219, amending
Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g), T.D. 6432, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 321.
49301 F. Supp. at 692.
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most part to smaller type corporations.5" The court held that in the
case before it there would be no administrative difficulties unless
the debt instruments were first determined to represent a class of
stock.51
The decisions in the Portage Plastics and the August F. Nielsen
cases cast serious doubts as to the applicability of the current regulation in determining whether purported debt constitutes a second class
of stock. The recent case of James L. Stinnett, Jr.52 confirms the inapplicability of the regulation in this situation. In Stinnett, the Tax
Court was confronted with a corporation which had outstanding 100
shares of $1 par value stock for a total authorized capitalization of
only $100. Furthermore, the corporation was indebted to its shareholders in the amount of $88,014.49. At the time of incorporation the
interests of two of the shareholders represented by stock and by the
notes were proportionate each to the other but disproportionate to the
interests of the other two shareholders whose interests were also disproportionate each to the other.
The Commissioner contended that for tax purposes the debt
represented by these notes should be regarded as equity capital, and
therefore, the corporation had outstanding two classes of stock. The
court conceded that the Commissioner's contention would be valid if
the case involved the treatment of payments of principal and interest
on account of these notes under general tax law. However, the Commissioner's contention was held not determinative of the issue in this
case.
Even accepting the [Commissioner's] argument, we would not
have two clases of stock ....
The notes did not entitle the holders to any right to vote or
to participate in the decision-maling process. The notes did not
entitle the holders to participate in any of the earnings or growth
of the business, being limited solely to the repayment of the 'debt'
itself without interest.... [ilt would be wholly unrealistic to treat
these notes standing alone as another class of stock.
[Ilt is our opinion that regardless whether the notes in
question be considered as 'debt' or as 'equity' under other provisions on the internal revenue laws, for purposes of section 1371
such notes do not change the character of the common stock so as
to give rise to more than one class of stock.5 3
5o Id.
51 Id. at 693.

52

1970).

53

CCH TAx Cr. REP. 2327 (Dec. 29,995, 54 T.C. -,
Id. at 2331-32.
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The Court then referred to its decision in W. C. Gamman5P4
wherein the original regulation was held to be invalid and noted that
the regulation had subsequently been amended. It then proceeded to
invalidate the amended regulation.
We do not regard as controlling with respect to the question
whether there is more than one class of stock within the meaning
of section 1371(a) the fact that 'debt' characterized as 'equity'
capital may be disproportionate to the respective common stock
interests of the stockholders. Accordingly, we must hold the regulation invalid as applied to this case. To hold otherwise not only
would serve largely to defeat the purpose for which Congress
enacted subchapter S, but would be inconsistent with the underlying scheme of the statute as exemplified by section 1376(b) (2).
(Emphasis added.) 55
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, section 1376(b) (2), provides
for the reduction of the shareholder's basis in his stock and indebtedness in the corporation for his portion of the corporation's net
operating loss which the corporation has passed through to him
under section 1874(c). The court concluded that this section treats
debt owing to stockholders as a secondary equity interest and
interpreted section 1376(b) (2) to be not only
a clear indication that the statute contemplates that stockholders of a subchapter S corporation would make advances or lend
money to the corporation, but for the purpose of reflecting losses
deducted by the stockholders in their returns, any resulting debt
is treated as a part of the stockholder's 'investment.' The losses
which are charged to that investment can only be attributable to
the interest of the stockholder represented by the common stock.
[I]t thus becomes apparent that for purposes of subchapter
S, the statute treats debt owing to a stockholder, whether or not
regarded as equity for other purposes, as a part of that stockholder's equity interest in the corporation. Debt owing to a nonstockholder is treated differently. 56
The court then discussed the effect which section 1376(b) could
have upon stockholders' interests which were originally proportionate.
This discussion can best be illustrated by an example.
Assume that A and B each own one half of the outstanding stock
of XYZ corporation. A purchased his stock from the corporation when
it was incorporated for $5,000, but B purchased his stock from C,
who was an original shareholder with A, for $3,000 at the beginning
T.C. 1 (1966).
CCH TAx CT. REP. 2332 (Dec. 29,995, 54 T. C.
1970.
56 Id.at 2332-33.
5446
55

-,

No. 20, Feb. 11,
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of current year. Also, A and B have each advanced $10,000 to the corporation in return for promissory notes. Assume further that the
corporation had no earnings or losses in prior years, but that during
the current year the corporation sustained a new operating loss of
$30,000. Since A and B each own one half of the coropration's stock,
then $15,000 of this loss is passed through to each shareholder to be
reported on his personal return. Under section 1376(b), A and B must
reduce the basis of their stock and indebtedness in the corporation.
Thus, A's basis is reduced to zero ($5,000 + $10,000 - $15,000). However, section 1376(b) (2) states that the shareholder's basis cannot
be reduced below zero. Since B's total basis is only $13,000 he may
only reduce his basis by $13,000 of the $15,000 loss. Thus, the application of section 1376(b) has resulted in a disproportionate right
in the losses of the corporation.
The court then observed that a capital structure consisting of stock
and shareholder loans is merely a means by which a shareholder who
does not have the necessary capital is able to reinvest his share of the
corporation's income and thereby repay funds advanced by the other
shareholders in the form of loans. The court concluded that since this
type of transaction was contemplated by and is the normal result of
the operation of the statute, it is reasonable to assume that Congress
did not intend that a debt owing to a stockholder be considered as a
second class of stock under the "thin capitalization" doctrine where the
instrument is a simple installment note without any incidents usually
attributed to stock "merely because it creates disproportionate rights
57
among the stockholders to the assets of the corporation."
IV. CONCLUSIONS

There is little in the legislative deliberations during 1958, 58 the
year in which subchapter S was enacted, to indicate the reason for the
one class of stock requirement. However, the predecessor provisions
of subcbapter S under which small corporations would have been taxed
as partnerships, were considered by the Senate in 1954.11 The proposed
legislation included a requirement that in order to be eligible a
corporation could have only one class of stock. The purpose of this
requirement was to avoid the administrative complexities which would
arise in the allocation of earnings and losses among several classes of
stock, and in particular in allocating when there is a payment of
57

Id. at 2333.

EP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1958)
59 S. RE'. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 119, 453-54 (1954).
58S.
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dividends on preferred stock in excess of earnings. 60 Under this theory,
then, the one class of stock requirement is compatible with the overall
purpose of the subchapter S provisions, which is to make tax relief
available to small corporations essentially comparable to partnerships
61
and proprietorships.
The problem of allocating earnings and losses does not appear
to be significant in the case of shareholder debt. The rights of the
debtor are specified in the instrument. Thus, there is not the
problem as there is when preferred stock is present-discretionary
action by the board of directors in declaring dividends. Section 1376
provides for the situation where losses exceed the basis of the common
stock and the common stockholders have debt, by permitting the re62
covery of the debt after the entire basis in stock has been consumed.
This appears to be the position of the courts in the cases discussed
3
supra, beginning with the Tax Court's opinion in Gamman.
The Tax Court's rejection of both of the regulations which have
been promulgated under section 1371(a) (4) raises the important
question of what authority the court will give to any regulation pertaining to shareholder debt and the one class of stock requirement.
One of the concurring opinions6 4 in the Stinnett case would seem to
indicate that any authority given to such a regulation will be light because no authority to promulgate legislation was given to the Commissioner under subchapter S, whereas section 1244 which was enacted
along with subchapter S to aid small businesses did contain such
authority. It was also noted that
• . . section 415 of the recently enacted Tax Reform Act of
1969 .. . provides legislative authority to [the Commissioner] to
determine whether 'an interest in a corporation is to be treated for

purposes of this title as stock or indebtedness.' This extremely
broad grant still leaves open the question whether it includes
authority to prescribe what is a second class of stock for purposes
of Subchapter S.65

Any regulation which is promulgated under section 1371(a) (4),
then, should be consistent with the language of that section, which,
after all, refers to stock and not to equity capital. The prior regulations have attempted to subject a corporation's subcbapter S status to
60 Id. at 453.
61 S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1958).
62 See generally McGaffey, The Requirement that a Subchapter S Corporation
May Have Only One Class of Stock, 50 MAQ. L. REv. 365, 373-75 (1966).
63W. C. Gamnman, 46 T.C. 1 (1966).
64 James L. Stinnett, Jr., CCH TAx CT. Riu'. 2327, 2334-35 (Dec. 29, 995, 54
T.C.-, No. 20, Feb. 11, 1970).
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the debt-equity test developed in the conventional corporation situation. This test "is merely a tool for reasoning" 66 and should not be
considered conclusive of the question of whether a corporation
electing under subchapter S has more than one class of stock. In the
final analysis the test for this issue should be to determine "whether
the instrument has sufficient characteristics under the applicable local
law to be designated as" 67 a class of stock. Such a test would be
reasonable and consistent with the statute and its underlying purpose.
David L. Fister
Id. at 2335.
67 Id.at 2334.
66

